Working Papers

· Persuasion via Weak Institutions (with Elliot Lipnowski and Doron Ravid)

Abstract. A sender commissions a study to persuade a receiver, but influences the report with some state-dependent probability. We show that increasing this probability can benefit the receiver and can lead to a discontinuous drop in the sender’s payoffs. We also examine a public-persuasion setting, where we show the sender especially prefers her report to be immune to influence in bad states. To derive our results, we geometrically characterize the sender’s highest equilibrium payoff, which is based on the concave envelope of her capped value function.

PDF SSRN June 18, 2019

· Screening with Frames (with Franz Ostrizek)

R&R at The Review of Economic Studies

Abstract. We analyze screening with frame-dependent valuations. A monopolist principal designs an extensive-form decision problem with frames at each stage. This allows the firm to induce dynamic inconsistency and thereby reduce information rents. We show that the optimal extensive form has a simple three-stage structure and uses only the two highest frames (high-low-high). Some types buy in the first stage, while others continue the interaction and buy at the last stage. The principal offers unchosen decoy contracts. Sophisticated consumers correctly anticipate that if they deviated, they would choose a decoy, which they want to avoid in a lower frame. This eliminates incentive compatibility constraints into types who don’t buy in the first stage. With naive consumers, the principal can perfectly screen by cognitive type and extract full surplus from naifs.

PDF April 18, 2019

Work in Progress

· Evidence Acquisition and Voluntary Disclosure

· Ambiguous Information (with Pietro Ortoleva)

· Behavioral Implementation in Extensive Form (with Franz Ostrizek)

· Robustness and Commitment in Competitive Disclosure Games